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Planning and Drafting Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation Arrangements
William A. Hancock
In fully analyzing nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements,
Mr. Hancock provides a useful aid for those engaged in the art of busi-
ness planning. The author begins by setting forth the advantages and
disadvantages of such arrangements and proceeds to an evaluation of the
relevant factors to be examined when considering a specific plan. Tax
incidents to both the employer and selected employee are emphasized by
the author, who discusses the pertinent case law, Treasury regulations,
and revenue rulings. The proper ingredients for precisely drafting the
necessary documents, such as the methods for computing the amounts to
be paid, the methods of actual payment, and the conditions which should
be included, are presented by Mr. Hancock as the final segment of his
comprehensive analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
3 N A DEFERRED compensation arrangement an employee
agrees to work for a current compensation of less than his ser-
vices could otherwise command, and, in return, his employer agrees
to pay him additional amounts in the future, usually after retire-
ment.' If used properly, the
principal advantage of the ar-
Tim AuTHOR: WLIAM A. HANCOCK rangement lies in its potential
(B.S., Tulane University; J.D., Western
Reserve University) is a practicing at- income tax savings. For ex-
torney in Cleveland, Ohio and a member ample, if an executive is re-
of the Cleveland, Ohio State, and Ameri-
can Bar Associations. ceiving current compensation
which puts him in the 70 per-
cent income tax bracket, he ob-
tains little after tax gain by receiving any more current taxable
income. On the other hand, if the executive can arrange to have a
portion of his compensation paid to him after retirement when his
I For a general discussion of deferred compensation agreements, see 7 Z. CAVITCH,
BusINESS ORGANiZATIONS ch. 135 (1967); 20-2d TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO
Deferred Compensation Arrangements [hereinafter cited as T.M. PORTFOLIoJ; 1 G.T.
WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCH-LD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE ExECUTIvE chs.
5-6 (3d ed. 1962). See generally Durkin, Non-Qualified Compensation Plans, 29 U.
CN. L. REV. 68 (1960); Lindquist, Fundamentals of Deferred Compensation, 43 ILL.
B.J. 756 (1955); McCaffrey, A Case of Executive Deferred Compensation, 13 J. AM.
Soc'y C.L.U. 120 (1959); Nolan, Deferred Compensation Planning: Special Situations
for Individuals in Large and Small Corporations, N.Y.U. 23D INST. ON FED. TAX. 217
(1965); Weisbard, Executives Compensation Package Can Have Many Benefits, Save
Him Much Money, 10 J. TAXATION 54 (1959).
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tax bracket will be much lower, a substantial tax savings might
result.
This article is designed to aid the practitioner: (1) to analyze
particular situations to ascertain whether a deferred compensation
arrangement can be advantageously used;' (2) to decide on a par-
ticular type of arrangement which would be most suitable for the
client and obtain the maximum tax advantages for both the em-
ployer and the executive, and would avoid miscellaneous problems
which are sometimes created by deferred compensation arrange-
ments; (3) to draft the appropriate documents.
II. IS A DEFERRED COMPENSATION
PLAN ADVISABLE?
Initially, it should be emphasized that deferred compensation
arrangements should be an integrated part of an overall compensa-
tion scheme and must be considered together with all other forms
of compensation. Before contemplating nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements, it should be determined that current
compensation is adequate, and that the more traditional fringe bene-
fits are not being overlooked. If such fringe benefits as qualified
pension, profit sharing, or stock option plans already exist, deferred
compensation arrangements should be considered together with
them.?
2 As used herein, deferred compensation arrangement refers only to a nonqualified
arrangement. Generally, a deferred compensation plan refers to a single agreement be-
tween a single employer and more than one employee and a deferred compensation con-
tract or agreement refers to an agreement covering only one executive. As used herein,
deferred compensation arrangement means either a plan or a contract, or both. The tax
laws draw no distinction between nonqualified deferred compensation plans or contracts.
However, see 1 G.T. WASHNGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 149 for some
important implications of a deferred compensation plan.
3 For a discussion of the means and ends of employee compensation, see E. WOOD, J.
CERNY & H. RAFUSH, TAX AsPEcTs Oi' DEFERRED COMPENSATION 1 (1966). Lynch,
Something About Deferred Compensation, 12 J. AM. Soc'Y C.L.U. 305 (1958), con-
tains a good discussion of when to use a deferred compensation arrangement, how it
compares with a regular savings program, and what types of insurance can be used in
connection with the program. For an interesting discussion of the deferred compensation
plans of Ford Motor Company, duPont, and Consolidation Coal Company, see Bergen,
Deferred Compensation, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 879 (1959).
Some basic considerations which must be made by the corporation in deciding on the
type of arrangement most beneficial to it are:
(1) whether the additional compensation to be paid is to be paid currently or to be
paid in the future, after retirement;
(2) whether the additional compensation is to be in the form of cash or stock of the
company;
(3) whether the arrangement is to benefit only selected key employees, or whether it
is to benefit all employees, or substantially all employees;
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Some of the possible advantages and disadvantages of a non-
qualified deferred compensation arrangement are as follows:4
A. Possible Advantages
(1) Income tax savings might result by using such an arrange-
ment.
(2) Nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are ex-
tremely flexible, can be very simple, and can be used to compensate
one selected employee or a group of selected employees. Also,
by definition, nonqualified arrangements are not subject to the
numerous and complex rules pertaining to qualified plans.
(3) If the deferred compensation agreement takes the form
of a mere promise by the corporation to pay additional compensa-
tion in the future, the corporation will have the funds it would
have allocated for the current compensation available to finance
its other operations, until they are actually paid.
(4) A deferred compensation arrangement can assist the em-
ployer in accelerating retirement of older executives, thereby help-
ing to entice younger men who can be assured that vacancies in
higher positions will become available.
(5) A deferred compensation arrangement provides a certain
amount of retirement security for the employee.
(6) The arrangement can serve to reduce executive turnover,
since the payments are usually forfeitable in the event of premature
resignation.
(7) There is little or no administration expense in the usual
nonqualified arrangement as opposed to the considerable expenses
involved in the establishment and administration of any qualified
plan.
B. Possible Disadvantages
(1) Nonqualified arrangements do not have the special tax
advantages of qualified plans, such as the possibility of obtaining
capital gain treatment, because under a nonqualified plan the pay-
ments are ordinary income to the executive when received, whether
in the form of cash, the employer's stock, or other property. Also,
(4) whether the arrangement is to be paid for entirely by the company or whether it
will allow employee participation; and
(5) whether the plan will involve the establishment of a separate fund, or merely in-
volve the general obligations of the company.
4 For additional discussion of these, see the sources cited in note 1 supra.
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no tax-free earnings can accumulate in a fund, as is possible under
a qualified plan.
(2) Benefits passing to those who survive the employee will
be subject to an estate tax in almost all instances, and the $5,000
death benefit income tax exclusion is not available in certain kinds
of deferred compensation arrangements.'
(3) The employee may prefer to have the current cash on
the theory that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush."
(4) The employer's deduction is deferred.
(5) Since the employer's deduction will be deferred, it may
fall in a year in which there are no profits or insufficient profits
against which to offset the deduction.
(6) A deferred compensation arrangement may involve a risk
to the employee of noncollection of the deferred amounts.
(7) The employee might react adversely to the usual provi-
sion that his deferred compensation will be forfeited if he leaves
the company before retirement.
(8) There might be some accounting problems and the com-
pany balance sheet may have to reflect a larger liability than an-
ticipated.6
5 See discussion note 100 infra & accompanying text.
6 Opinion No. 12, of the Accounting Principles Board provides in substance that if
an employee is to be paid deferred compensation after he retires, it should be accrued
during the employee's period of active employment. To illustrate by an exceedingly
oversimplified example, in which no attempt has been made to take into account the ef-
fects of interest, if an employee age 60 is awarded a deferred compensation contract in
which he agrees to work for $40,000 per year current compensation until age 65 at which
time he would retire and receive $20,000 per year deferred compensation for the next
5 years until age 70, then the company should accrue on its books $60,000 per year
during his active employment with the company so that, at the end of the period of ac-
tive employment, it would have accrued on its books a liability for $100,000 of com-
pensation. As the $100,000 is actually paid to the employee, this liability would be
reduced. On the other hand, if the employee's period of active employment can be said
to extend reasonably beyond his retirement into the period in which he is receiving de-
ferred compensation, because the services which he is to render after retirement are rea-
sonably proportionate to the value which he is receiving under the contract, then there is
no need to accrue the deferred compensation on the books of the company before retire-
ment. If a deferred compensation contract calls for services to be rendered after retire-
ment, these services must be valued at the time the contract is made. This is obviously
going to cause some practical difficulty. In the above example, if at the time the contract
was made it was agreed that consultative services were going to be rendered and that they
were, in fact, worth $20,000 to the company, then no rapid accruals would be necessary.
If, however, it were determined that these conditions were placed in the contract merely
on the advice of counsel and had no substantive effect, then they would be disregarded
for accounting purposes and the company would accrue the total amount of compensation
during the period of active employment. Of course, there are many possibilities in be-
tween these examples. If it were determined that the services to be performed would
be worth $10,000 per year, then the company would accrue only $10,000 per year during
the period of active employment to make up for the difference. If the company has a
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(9) Last, but perhaps most important, considered under all
of the facts, the plan may result in an overall net economic loss to
the employee it was designed to benefit.
This latter problem makes it necessary to analyze each proposed
deferred compensation arrangement, considering each of the factors
listed below, to ascertain how much, if any, net economic gain will
be achieved by a plan. Many times the results of a complete analy-
sis show an extremely small net gain, or even a net economic loss.
The following are some of the factors which should be considered
in evaluating a proposed arrangement from a purely financial stand-
point.'
C. Financial Factors
(1) Progressive Income Tax Rates. -Although our present
income tax rates are progressive, it is important to note that the
progression decreases in the higher income tax brackets. For ex-
ample, the brackets increase from about 22 percent at $4,000 tax-
able income to about 58 percent at $44,000 taxable income, an
increase of 36 percent. But, they only increase to 68 percent at
$84,000, an increase of 36 percent in the $40,000 between $4,000
and $44,000 and an increase of only 10 percent for the $40,000
between $44,000 and $84,000.8 The obvious effect is that the
higher the executive's current compensation, the smaller will be
the relative tax savings to be achieved by deferring part of it.
(2) Effect on Other Benefits Received by the Employee.
Many typical qualified pension and profit sharing plans base their
benefits on the participant's current compensation. Therefore, if
the participant's current compensation is only a part of his total
compensation, he receives less under these qualified plans than he
would have received if all of his compensation had been paid cur-
rently.
(3) Loss of Investment Yield. -If the executive is paid the
number of deferred compensation pladis requiring rapid accrual of deferred amounts,
the balance sheet might have to reflect a considerable liability, making the plans sub-
stantially less attractive. (It should be noted that Opinion No. 8 of the Accounting
Principles Board provides, in effect, that if all of the deferred compensation contracts
taken together are equivalent to a pension plan, then the new accounting rules contained
in that Bulletin involving accounting for the costs of pension plans shall be followed.)
AICPA ACCT'G PRINClPLES BD., OPINION No. 12 (1967).
7 For additional discussion of how to make this evaluation, see Gemmill, Deferral of
Compensation Frequently Results in Overall Economic Loss, 19 J. TAXATION 276
(1963).
8 INT. RLzv. CoDE op 1954, § 1 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
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compensation currently, he would be able to invest the after-tax
increase and obtain a yield on the investment. While the yield
would also be subject to tax, most of it would probably be at the
capital gain rate and there would still be a substantial net yield to
the executive. By deferring the compensation, the investment
yield would be lost to some extent, depending upon how long the
payments are deferred, the particular executive's ability to invest,
and his after-tax investment yield.
(4) Inflation. -The establishment of a fixed amount of cash
on the basis of today's dollars, to be paid later in dollars worth sub-
stantially less because of inflation, has an obvious disadvantage to
the executive. The amount of this loss will depend upon how the
inflation spiral progresses and upon how long the payments are
deferred.'
(5) Employee's Other Income. -If the employee will have
substantial other taxable income after retirement, as from annuity
policies or investment yields, the savings from deferring current
income will be decreased.'0
It should be pointed out that the above observations are based
on the hypothesis that the deferred amount will be exactly the same
as the amount which the corporation would be willing to pay cur-
rently. This may not be true because, since the corporation's pay-
ments will be deferred, it might be willing to pay more deferred
compensation than current compensation. This is partly due to
the effects of interest, earnings, and inflation, and partly due to the
general optimism of most businessmen that the corporation will
be able to afford more compensation in the future than it can in
the present.
In summary, no deferred compensation plan should be sug-
gested by the company until its total compensation picture has been
analyzed and found to be adequate in terms of present compensa-
tion and traditional fringe benefits, and until the various types of
tax-favored qualified plans have been investigated. Further, the
executive should not suggest or accept a plan until his particular
situation has been analyzed and the net economic effect of a de-
ferral of part of his compensation has been determined.
9 Inflation is sometimes estimated to be about 3 percent per year.
10 In computing the potential tax savings, consideration should be given to the extra
exemption allowed persons 65 years of age and older. CODE § 151 (c).
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III. TYPES OF ARRANGEMENTS -
TAx CONSIDERATIONS
While there are many nontax aspects to nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements, in many, if not most situations, tax
considerations will dictate 'both the advisability of having such an
arrangement and much of its content. Basically, four tax related
objectives can and should be achieved by a deferred compensation
arrangement:1
(1) obtaining a deduction for the employer for the deferred
amounts, at least when payments are actually made;
(2) achieving maximum assurance for the employee that he
will, in fact, receive the deferred amounts;
(3) preventing the deferred amounts from being taxed to the
employee before they are actually received; 2
(4) assuring both the employer and the employee that no other
disadvantages will be created by the plan or by distributions made
pursuant to the plan.
Objectives one and three will be accomplished by almost any
formbook plan. 3 However, to achieve maximum effectiveness
most situations will require at least a slight alteration of the basic
formbook plan, and generally the situation will require almost total
original drafting. 4 It is therefore essential that the draftsman be
cognizant of the applicable tax rules so that no objective is inad-
vertently lost. Each of the above objectives will be discussed in
turn.
A. Obtaining a Deduction for the Employer for the Deferred
Amounts at Least When Payments Are Actually Made
An arrangement which requires payments to be made as com-
pensation but does not allow a corresponding deduction at any time
is entirely unsatisfactory. Further, an arrangement which requires
an accrual of what ordinarily would be a deductible expense in one
year, but precludes a deduction until some years later when the
" The first three are examined in Staetzer, Deferred Compensation Contracts: Indi-
vidual Contracts: Non-qualified General Plans, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAx. 479
(1963). Hoffman, Tax Influences in Shaping the Executive Pay Package, 40 TAxEs
386, 394 (1962), contains an interesting chart showing tax implications of all forms
of supplementary compensation.
12 Stuetzer, supra note 11, at 480.
13 See 5 3. RAEKIN & M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMs ch. 12 (1967).
14 Since one of the advantages of a nonqualified plan is that it is extremely flexible,
formbooks should be used only for ideas and as a checklist.
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payments are actually made is not very attractive, but the employer
eventually does get the deduction, and if there is a corresponding
tax advantage to a key employee, the employer may consent to the
arrangement. The arrangement must be properly planned so that
the deduction is not permanently lost.
The basis of the problem is that, unlike current compensation
of employees which is deductible under section 162 as a business
expense, or under section 212 as a related nonbusiness expense,
deferred compensation is deductible, if at all, under section 404 of
the Internal Revenue Code, and then only if the requirements of
section 162, or section 212, are satisfied. 5 Section 404 and the
regulations thereunder provide in substance that the employer is
entitled to a deduction for deferred compensation only when the
compensation is actually paid, and only if the employee's rights to
the compensation or contribution are nonforfeitable. In order to
more fully understand these requirements, it is necessary to discuss
the concepts of funding and forfeitability.
A funded plan is one which is financed by contributions to a
trust, to escrow arrangements, to the purchase of insurance or an
annuity contract, or in any similar manner where the employee has
a direct legally enforceable interest in a res which purports to be
insulated from the claims of general creditors of the corporation.
An unfunded plan is one in which the employee has no direct le-
gally enforceable interest in any such res; rather, he depends en-
tirely upon the unsecured promise of the corporation to make the
deferred payments."
The concept of forfeitability refers to whether an employee's
rights to either money deposited in a fund or payments to be made
by the corporation are conditioned and forfeitable in any way.
Many deferred compensation contracts contain provisions to the
effect that the employee will receive the deferred compensation
15 CODE § 404(a); see Times Publishing Co., 13 T.C. 329 (1949), aff'd per curiam,
184 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1950). This, of course, applies only to deferrals of compensa-
tion contemplated by section 404 and does not apply to bonuses based on profits for the
current year which are paid as soon after the end of the year as the figures are determined.
See Knight, Income Tax Consequences of Non-qualified Deferred Compensation, I TAX
LAW. 163 (fall 1967).
16 Neither the Code nor the regulations define the word "funded." A functional
definition appearing in Stuetzer, supra note 11, at 481, reads as follows:
A funded non-qualified deferred compensation arrangement is one in which
the employer makes contributions to a non-exempt trust, purchases for an em-
ployee a non-qualified annuity, or makes payments of any kind, so that, if the
executive's rights therein were nonforfeitable, taxable income to the executive
would result by virtue of the statute, constructive receipt, or economic benefit.
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only upon certain conditions, usually having to do with staying
with the company for a certain period of time, rendering consulta-
tive services after retirement, or refraining from entering into com-
petition with the company after retirement. In such a situation,
the employee's rights would be forfeitable because if he did not
satisfy any of the conditions, he would lose his rights to the addi-
tional compensation.17
Once the concepts of funding and forfeitability are understood,
the tax rules are quite simple to state. Section 404 provides that
the deduction may be taken "[iln the taxable year when paid...
if the employee's rights to or derived from such employer's con-
tribution or such compensation are non-forfeitable at the time the
contribution or compensation is paid."'" It is thus clear that if the
arrangement is anfunded, the employer will be entitled to a de-
duction only when the compensation is actually paid whether or
not the employee's rights are forfeitable."9
If the plan is funded, the employer may deduct his contribution
when it is paid if the employee's rights are nonforfeitable. How-
ever, if the employee's rights are forfeitable, a Treasury regulation
provides that the employer will never get a deduction, even when
the funds are actually paid to the employee. This possibly invalid20
regulation provides as follows: "If an amount is paid during the
taxable year to a trust or under a plan and the employee's rights to
such amounts are forfeitable at the time the amount is paid, no de-
duction is allowable for such amount for any taxable year."'"
The rule is both harsh and illogical. The Court of Claims
would seem to be correct in allowing the deduction when payments
are in fact made to the employee on the theory that the trustee or
escrow agent, for example, made the payments as agent for the
17 See Treas. Reg. 5 1-402 (b) -1 (a) (2) i (1956), T.D. 6783, 1965-1 CUM. BULL.
180.
L8 CoDE § 4 04 (a) (5) (emphasis added).
19 See Treas. Reg. 5 1.404(a)-12 (1956); Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. BULL.
174; Knight, supra note 15, at 187; 20-2d T.M. PORTFOLIO, supra note 1, at .A23-24.
Rev. Rul. 55-212, 1955-1 CuM. BULL, 299, points out that the deduction must be taken
when the compensation is paid even though the employer uses the accrual method of
accounting and the employee's rights are nonforfeitable. Although the ruling involved
the 1939 Code, its principle is still valid.
20 See Buttrey Stores, Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d 799 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Mississippi
River Fuel Corp. v. United States, 314 F.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Russell Mfg. Co., v.
United States, 175 F. Supp. 159 (C. Cl. 1959), nonacquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 59-383,
1959-2 CuM. BULL. 456-57. See also United States v. Russell Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 13
(2d Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion).
21 Treas. Reg. § 1A04(a)-12 (1956) (emphasis added).
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employer.22 However, many courts reach the result called for by
the Treasury regulation and hold that the deduction is completely
lost.23 It would therefore seem that this must be taken as the rule
unless the employer is willing to go to litigation in the Court of
Claims.
In summary, objective number one will be satisfied if a plan
does not provide for funding and does not make the employee's
rights in the fund forfeitable.2 4
B. Achieving for the Employee the Maximum Assurance That
He Will in Fact Receive the Deferred Amount
If the employee is to consider a plan valuable, he must be rea-
sonably confident that he will actually receive the deferred
amounts. In a large, widely held corporation, this will rarely pre-
sent a problem. However, in a smaller, closely held corporation,
the employee may feel that the uncertainty of collecting on the
unsecured promise of the corporation to pay the deferred amount
outweighs the other advantages of the plan."6 There are various
ways to give the employee somewhat more than the mere unsecured
promise of the corporation without going so far as to fund the ar-
rangement and incur all of the disadvantages which funding en-
tails.2"
Initially, it must be pointed out that the concept of funding has
no application where the employer merely sets aside money for a
known future obligation and does not try to give the employee an
interest in those funds or to insulate them from the claims of the
22 Cases cited note 20 supra.
2 See Wesley Heat Treating Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1959);
Shalite Corp. v. United States, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9257 (E.D. Tenn. 1967); Mississippi
River Fuel Corp., 29 T.C. 1248 (1958), and Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Kohler,
164 F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Mo. 1958), both afI'd, 266 F.2d 190 (8th Cit. 1959), cert. de-
nied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959); Times Publishing Co., 13 T.C. 329 (1949), aft'd per
curiam, 184 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1950).
24 See the discussion of collateralized funding in text accompanying note 35 infra.
25 This is not to say that the executive does not trust the management. In small dose-
ly held corporations, the executive is probably more concerned with such possibilities as
overall economic declines affecting the company, or death of the present majority share-
holders or chief executive officer of the corporation rather than with the honesty of the
present management.
26 See discussion in text accompanying note 35 infra for a somewhat controversial
way of doing this.
Funding will almost always preclude one of the desired objectives. If the employee's
rights are forfeitable, the employer may lose the deduction and if the employee's rights
are nonforfeitable, then the payments to the fund may constitute an economic benefit to
the employee, resulting in immediate taxation.
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general corporate creditors. Thus, the employer which incurs a
liability each year as the services are rendered may choose to set
aside cash or to make investments in securities, insurance, or an-
nuity contracts so that sufficient funds will be available to pay the
deferred compensation amounts when they become due. If the
employer, and not the employee, is the beneficiary of such an
arrangement, the employee will not 'be taxed prior to receiving
payments. 7 Thus, the executive can in fact be given reasonable
assurances that the corporation will finance its obligation to him
by the means above indicated, without causing immediate taxation
to the employee or causing the employer to permanently lose the
deduction.2"
One method by which the company could finance a deferred
compensation arrangement without any adverse tax effects involves
the use of a commercial annuity. Under this method, the corpora-
tion would purchase a life insurance contract, convertible to an
annuity, on the life of the executive, with the policy being "owned
by and payable to the corporation."2"  When the employee reaches
the designated retirement age, the life insurance policy would be
converted into an annuity. Although part of the annuity payments
would be taxed to the corporation, 0 the corporation would be al-
lowed a deduction for the amounts paid to the employee." There-
fore, the annuity, along with the tax savings achieved by the deduc-
tion, would provide the requisite amount to fulfill the contractual
obligation.82
Since the corporation will obtain an income tax deduction
when the deferred compensation is paid, there is no need to set
aside the entire amount of deferred compensation earned in any
given year. For example, if the total annual amount to be de-
ferred is $10,000, the corporation can annually credit to the reserve
2 7 Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957); Rev. Rul. 59-79, 1959-1
Cum. BULL. 15.
28 The arrangement can also provide for periodic information reports to be given
to the executive for assurance that adequate financial arrangements can be made. But
it is important for the corporation to make certain that such reports contain only infor-
mation and contain nothing which would give the executive a legally enforceable right
to any fund or insurance or annuity contract before payments are to be made.
29 Stuetzer, supra note 11, at 489.
30 CODE § 72 (a).
31 Id. § 404.
32 The arrangement can be designed to provide an element of idemnification to the
company in the event of the untimely death of the executive. For a more detailed dis-
cussion, see 17 J. TAXATIoN 229, 230 (1962).
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$5,200." When the payment is later made to the employee, the
reserve can be charged $5,200 and that year's provision for taxes
can be charged $4,800. Of course, the adequacy of the fund created
by this arrangement depends upon the corporation having profits
in the year of payment against which to match the deduction."
To complete this discussion, the concept of "collateralized fund-
ing" must be mentioned. This concept refers to an arrangement
in which the employer enters into a contract obligating itself to pay
deferred compensation and then arranges with a third party, most
often an insurance company, to guarantee payment to the employee
in the event that the employer fails to pay. Its obvious advantage
is that it gives almost positive assurance to the employee that he
will in fact receive the payments, but a difference of opinion exists
as to whether this procedure has any tax dangers.35
To summarize, if the objective of providing maximum assur-
ance to the employee is to be accomplished by creating a fund for
his benefit in which he has legally enforceable rights and which
purports to be insulated from the claims of corporate creditors, then
the employee will lose the objective of being taxed only when de-
ferred compensation is received. Furthermore, if the employee's
rights in the fund are in any way forfeitable, then the employer's
deduction will be permanently lost. Nevertheless, there are a
number of sound ways to give the employee additional assurances
that the money will be paid to him without incurring any corre-
sponding tax detriment. Basically these methods comprehend
sound financing by the corporation either through insurance, pri-
vate investment, securities, or stock of the corporation itself. In
addition, there are some ways to give the employee almost absolute
assurances that he will receive the deferred compensation, but these
methods are relatively untried and extreme caution should be exer-
cised in their use.
C. Assuring the Employee That the Deferred Amounts Will Be
Taxable Income to Him No Earlier Than When They Are Re-
ceived
Having formulated a plan which assures the employer that it
-3 A 48 percent tax rate is assumed.
34 Stuetzer, supra note 11, at 489.
35 Collateralized funding is discussed in detail in Rivers, Collateralized Deferred
Compensation - Poison or Panacea, 20 J. AM. SoC'Y C.L.U. 37 (1966), wherein the
author concludes that the arrangement will accomplish objective number 2 with little or
no adverse tax consequences. For a contrary opinion, see 20-2d T.M. PORTFOLIO, supra
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will receive a deduction for the payments of the deferred portion
of the compensation, at least when they are made, and which as-
sures the employee, to the maximum extent reasonably possible,
that he will receive the deferred portion of his compensation, it
will probably be essential to assure the employee that the deferred
compensation will not be taxed to him before it is actually received.
This is probably the most complicated part of the problem and the
area where most of the cases have arisen and where most of the
writing has been done. Basically, the Internal Revenue Service
has two principal theories on which to base an assertion that the
employee has received taxable income before he actually receives
the cash: the constructive receipt theory and the economic benefit
theory.38
note 1, at A4. See also Rivers, Deferred Compensation Contracts, 103 TRUSTS & ES-
TATES 57 (1964), for an earlier discussion of collateralized arrangements.
86 While constructive receipt and economic benefit are the two principal theories on
which the IRS relies, usually asserting them in the alternative as in George W. Drysdale,
32 T.C. 378 (1959), rW'd & remanded, 277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1960), variations on
the two principal theories and other separate theories are also employed. Further, one
theory is sometimes called by two different names. For instance, the economic benefit
doctrine is sometimes called the "cash equivalent doctrine" and the constructive receipt
doctrine is sometimes called the "deferral of previously earned income doctrine."
A theory which arises in the context of boxing promotion contracts is the joint ven-
ture theory. Example 5 of Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 174, discusses this
theory and it was recently litigated in Ray S. Robinson, 44 T.C. 20 (1965), involving
the contract which was made for the Sugar Ray Robinson-Carmen Basilio fight. It is
unlikely that the joint venture theory will cause any problem in the usual deferred com-
pensation agreement involving a corporation and an executive-employee. See Delson &
Broser, Sugar Ray's Deferred Pay Contract Holds Door Open for Earnings Postponement,
23 J. TAXA-1TON 80 (1965).
The assignment of income doctrine is generally used to determine who receives in-
come rather than what is income (the economic benefit doctrine) or when income is re-
ceived (the constructive receipt doctrine). Sometimes the doctrines are confused as
illustrated by two commentators analyzing the same case and each applying a different
theory. Hicks v. United States, 314 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963), is a good example.
Rothschild & Ness, IRS Confines Hicks Case and Sanctions Deferred Compensation
Choices, 19 J. TAXATION 216 (1963), treats this case as dealing with constructive re-
ceipt, while Mr. Knight, the author of T.M. PORTFOLIO, supra note 1, who also wrote
the Tax Lawyer article cited in note 15 supra, treats Hicks under the assignment of in-
come concepts. The Hicks case involved a qualified profit sharing plan of a bank which
provided, in effect, that if the employee gave prior written direction to the employer in
each year, the whole of the employee's share of the annual profit sharing contribution
would be paid into the profit sharing plan for the account of the employee, but if the
employee did not give such prior written notice to the employer, only 40 percent of his
share of the annual contribution would be paid into the trust and the remaining 60 per-
cent would be paid to the employee in cash. Mr. Hicks gave prior timely notice to have
60 percent of his share put into the plan. The employer did so and Mr. Hicks reported
his income for that year without including the amount put into the plan. The Commis-
sioner assessed a deficiency and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Mr. Hicks
had constructively received the income and it was therefore taxable to him. Essentially,
the court reasoned that the bank had paid the contribution to itself as trustee upon the
direction of Mr. Hicks and relied on some traditional assignment of income cases, e.g.,
Helvering v. Hors, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 314
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The doctrine of constructive receipt is properly applicable to
determine when an item of income is sufficiently realized so that
it may be taxed to a cash basis taxpayer."
The basis for the doctrine is found in the following language
of the regulations:
Gains, profits, and income are to be included in gross income for
the taxable year in which they are actually or constructively re-
ceived by the taxpayer unless includible for a different year in
accordance with the taxpayer's method of accounting. 38
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession
is constructively received by him in the taxable year during which
it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made
available so that he may draw upon it at any time .... 39
Generally, under the cash receipts and disbursements method in
the computation of taxable income, all items which constitute gross
income (whether in the form of cash, property, or services) are
to be included for the taxable year in which actually or construc-
tively received.40
The following is an often quoted statement of the doctrine:
It is clear that the doctrine of constructive receipt is to be spar-
F.2d at 183-85. The Hicks case could have been disturbing because of some of the
language used, but subsequently Rev. Rul. 63-180, 1963-2 CtM. BULL. 189, confined
the case to its special facts and it is therefore not significant in the nonqualified deferred
compensation area. See also 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 328 (1964).
The case of Llewellyn v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1961), is an assign-
ment of income case usually mentioned in connection with Hicks. In the Llewellyn
case, the taxpayer was a pathologist who had a contract with a hospital under which he
received a percentage of certain laboratory receipts. The agreement was modified to pro-
vide that some of these receipts would not be paid directly to the doctor but would be
used to purchase annuity contracts for him. The court held, in effect, that Dr. Llewellyn
had made anticipatory assignments of part of his income to the insurance company.
Under the sales theory, if the taxpayer cancels an old agreement and enters into a new
one whereby he receives payments for life, the IRS may assert that there has been a sale or
exchange of the old rights in consideration for an annuity policy. See Olmsted Inc.
Life Agency, 35 T.C. 428 (1960), nonacquiesced in, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 6, afl'd, 304
F.2d 16 (8th Cit. 1962). However, unless the taxpayer actually receives a commercial
annuity policy, this theory will probably not cause taxpayers much trouble.
a7 This should be contrasted with the economic benefit doctrine which is applicable
to determine what is income and the assignment of income doctrine which is applicable
to determine who receives income. As with many closely related doctrines, the courts,
the IRS, and the commentators have not always observed the proper technical distinc-
tions, and there is some disagreement as to which concept is most applicable to a given
factual situation. For some examples of disagreements, see Schlossberg, "Cash Equival-
ent' and "Constructive Receipt" - How These Doctrines Bring Immediate Taxation,
22 J. TAXATION 18 (1965).
For an interesting discussion of the differences between the constructive receipt doc-
trine and the economic benefit doctrine, see the opinion in E.T. Sproull, 16 T.C. 244,
246-47 (1951).
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1957).
-9 d. § 1.451-2(a) (1957), T.D. 6723, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 73.
401d. 5 1A46-1(c) (1) (i) (1957), T.D. 6584, 1962-1 CUM. BULL. 67.
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ingly used; that amounts due from a corporation but unpaid, are
not to be included in the income of an individual reporting his
income on a cash receipts basis unless it appears that the money
was available to him, that the corporation was able and ready to
pay him, that his right to receive was not restricted, and that his
failure to receive resulted from exercise of his own choice.41
In 1960, the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling
60-31,42 which is still the most authoritative guide on the applica-
tion of the doctrine of constructive receipt to deferred compensa-
tion arrangements. The Ruling sets forth a series of five examples
and then proceeds to discuss each of them and to indicate the Ser-
vice's position on whether the deferral of the income would be
given effect for tax purposes.4" In addition, Revenue Ruling 67-
449 suggests another planning opportunity. 4
In considering the concept of constructive receipt, a distinction
must again be drawn between funded and nonfunded plans,45 and
plans in which the employee's rights are forfeitable and those in
which his rights are vested. In one particular combination of a
funded plan where the employee's rights are vested, constructive
receipt is not important because the Code itself provides, in section
402(b), for a tax to the employee when the employer deposits in
a nonqualified trust, an amount to which the employee has a non-
forfeitable right even though actual distribution is delayed.48
41C.E. Gullet 31 B.T.A. 1067, 1069 (1935). In the Gullett case, the taxpayer
was an officer and director of a corporation which was having financial difficulty. In
fact, at the time of the case the corporation was in the hands of receivers. The directors
had passed a resolution restricting the corporation from paying directors' salaries in full
until the financial conditions of the company improved. The company paid only $6,000
to each director and accrued the remainder on its books. Each director reported the
$6,000 but the Commissioner attempted to have each director's income increased by the
difference between the amount drawn and reported by him and the amount accrued and
reported by the company, on the theory that those amounts were constructively received
by the director-taxpayer. The court held that the doctrine of constructive receipt was
not applicable.
42 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174. This important ruling brought forth a host of articles.
E.g., Axelrad, Deferred Corpensation Arrangements and Constructive Receipt of l-
come: Revenue Ruling, 60-31, 35 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 149 (1959); Gordon, The
New Look of Deferred Compensation Contracts, 10 TUL. TAx INsT. 593 (1961); Neal,
Deferred Compensation Plans: Qualifying for Non-Qualified Treatment, 13 VAND. L.
REV. 461 (1960); Rice, The New Tax Policy on Deferred Compensation, 59 MICH. L.
REV. 381 (1961); Constructive Receipt on Deferred Cornpensation Eased by New Rul-
ing, 12 J. TAXATIoN 180 (1960).
4 3 See text accompanying notes 50-53 infra.
44 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 51, at 16.
4 5 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
46While the rule set forth in CODE § 402(b) is clear, its application, especially
in the Sixth Circuit is not clear because of two recent cases involving funded plans. In
George W. Drysdale, 32 T.C. 378 (1959), rev'd & remanded, 277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir.
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The concept of constructive receipt is important in the other
combinations as illustrated by the following examples. The first
examples are those in which the constructive receipt theory will
not be applied. Subsequent examples illustrate some "red flag"
situations, which should be analyzed carefully before assurances
are made to the employee, and some situations which will almost
certainly cause the application of the constructive receipt doctrine
and premature taxation of the employee's benefits.
(1) Situations Which Should Cause No Constructive Receipt
Problems. -Revenue Ruling 60-31 provides that "the statute
[Code section 4511 cannot be administered by speculating whether
the payor would have been willing to agree to an earlier pay-
ment."47  The Ruling cites the C.E. Gullett case' and the J.D.
Amend case4' and apparently indicates approval of them. The
Ruling also sets forth three examples of commonly used deferred
compensation arrangements in which no constructive receipt prob-
lem is involved.
In the first example, the taxpayer was to be employed by a
corporation for 5 years at a stated annual salary, plus additional
compensation, of $10,000 per year. The additional compensation
was to be credited to a bookkeeping reserve account and deferred,
accumulated, and paid in five installments upon termination of the
taxpayer's full-time employment with the corporation. No trust
was created by the bookkeeping reserve - the corporation being
merely under a contractual obligation to make the payments.5
In the second example, the taxpayer was an officer and director
of the corporation which adopted a plan whereby a percentage of
1960), the Government did not urge the application of section 402(b) and the case
was decided for the taxpayer based on the lack of any constructive receipt or economic
benefit. In Doty v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Mich. 1962), rev'd, 323
F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1963), which was stipulated to be factually identical to the Drysdale
case, the Government advanced the application of section 402 (b) because the employer
contributed to a trust in which the employee's interest was nonforfeitable. The district
court agreed with the Government and decided against the taxpayer. However, the case
was reversed on appeal for two reasons. First, the appellate court thought that the em-
ployee's interests were forfeitable, 323 F.2d at 650, which is not too disturbing because
the facts are somewhat complicated and the point is disputable. However, the appellate
court also indicated that it felt compelled to follow the Drysdale case because of stare
decisis. Id. This causes some doubt as to the future application of section 402(b) in
the Sixth Circuit. In Doty the dispute was placed on the suspended docket while Drys-
dale was being appealed, and this may have something to do with the Sixth Circuit's
refusal to give the Government another "bite at the apple."
47 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174, 178.
48 31 B.T.A. 1067 (1935); see note 41 supra.
49 13 T.C. 178 (1949), acquiesced in, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 1.
50 Rev. Rul. 60-31 (example 1), 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 174, 175.
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the annual net earnings in excess of a certain figure was designated
for division among the participants in proportion to their respective
salaries. The amount was not currently paid to the participants,
but the corporation each year credited the amount of the partici-
pant's share for that year on its books in each participant's separate
account. The participants were paid from the account annually
beginning when the employee either reached age 60, was no longer
employed by the company, or became totally disabled. The cor-
poration's liability to make the payments was contingent upon the
employee refraining from engaging in any business competitive to
that of the corporation, making himself available to the corpora-
tion for consultation and advice after retirement or termination of
services, and retaining unencumbered any interest in the plan. If
the employee died either before or after the beginning of payments,
amounts in the employee's account were distributable in install-
ments to his beneficiaries. Again, no trust was created for the
benefit of the employees, and the corporation was merely under a
contractual obligation to make the payments.5"
In the third example, the taxpayer, an author, and the corpora-
tion, a publisher, executed an agreement under which the taxpayer
granted to the publisher the exclusive right to sell a book he had
written. This agreement provided that the publisher would pay
the author specified royalties based on the money received from
the sale. On the same day another agreement was signed in which
the parties mutually agreed that the publisher would not pay the
taxpayer more than $100,000 in any calendar year notwithstand-
ing any contrary provisions contained in the first contract. Under
the second contract, sums in excess of $100,000 accruing in'any
one year were to be carried over by the publisher into future ac-
counting periods and the publisher was not required either to pay
interest to the taxpayer on any such excess sums or to segregate any
such sums in any manner."2
Another specific plan has -been approved by the IRS as set forth
in a recent revenue ruling, the facts of which are as follows:
Under the deferred compensation plan, awards of supplemental
compensation are generally payable to key employees in equal cash
installments in each of 4 years beginning with the year in which
the award is made. The first installment is payable on or before
April 15 of the year the award is made. An additional installment
51Id. (example 2), at 175-76.
52 Id (example 3), at 176.
19681
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19: 921
becomes payable on January 10 of each of the three succeeding
years.
The right of an employee to receive payment of any install-
ment of an award subsequent to the first installment will accrue
only if, during the entire period from the making of the award
until December 31 of the year preceding that in which the install-
ment is payable, he has earned out such installment. An award
installment is earned out by continuing in the employ of the em-
ployer or, if employment is terminated for a reason other than
death, by (1) refraining from (A) engaging ... in competition
with the employer, or (B) entering the service of any organization
engaged in competition with the employer; and (2) making him-
self available . . . [for consultative services] while ... in the em-
ploy of the employer.
Each installment of an award may, at the employee's election,
be deferred until after the termination of employment, at which
time it may be paid in one or more installments of cash or the
employer's common stock. The right to receive any such deferred
payment shall accrue only if, during the entire period from the
termination of any employee's employment until December 31 of
the year preceding that in which such payment is to be made, the
above conditions have been satisfied.
In addition to the election to defer an installment of a supple-
mental compensation award, the plan provides employees with an
election as to the manner (year and amount) in which any such
installment which he elects to defer is to be paid following the
termination of employment.
The initial election is required to be made not later than De-
cember 15 of the year preceding the year in which the installment
would otherwise become payable. The subsequent election is re-
quired to be made prior to the termination of employment.53
These four examples may be taken as absolutely free from any con-
structive receipt problem.
In addition, the following three cases illustrate specific situa-
tions in which no constructive receipt problem should exist at the
present time.
In the James F. Oates case,54 the taxpayer was an insurance
agent about to retire. He and other agents entered into negotiations
with their employer-insurance company to modify their commission
payment arrangement. Under the previously existing arrange-
ments, the agents received a relatively large commission on the
first premium and successively smaller commissions on the next
nine renewal premiums, which resulted in the income of a retired
agent constantly decreasing after retirement. Dissatisfied with this
53 Id. 67-449, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 51, at 16.
54 18 T.C. 570 (1952), aff'd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), acquiesced in, Rev.
Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174, withdrawing prior nonacquiescence in, 1952-2
CuM. BULL. 5.
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result, the agents negotiated a new contract with the company
which provided in substance that the commissions which would
accrue after the retirement of the agent would be paid in fixed
monthly installments irrespective of the time when the company
collected them. The Commissioner attempted to assess a tax de-
ficiency against Mr. Oates based on the difference between the
monthly payments which he actually received and the renewal
commissions which he would have been entitled to receive had he
not entered into the modified contract a few days before his retire-
ment, on the theory that he had constructively received that income.
Both the Tax Court and the federal circuit court held for the tax-
payer saying, in effect, that there had been a novation. 5  The Tax
Court reasoned that because the parties had a right to negotiate the
old contract, they also had a right to negotiate the new one. The
most important factors in the case5" were that the new contract was
entered into before the due date for the first payments covered 'by
the old contract, there was a valid business purpose' for the new
55 A novation is a contract that: "(a) discharges immediately a previous contractual
duty .... and (b) creates a new contractual duty, and (c) includes as a party one who
neither owed the previous duty nor was entitled to its performance." RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRAcTs § 424 (1932).
Since the first contract was between Mr. Oates and the insurance company, and the
second contract was between Mr. Oates and the insurance company, this reasoning could
be challenged.
56 The factors are indicated in the often quoted last paragraph of the federal court's
opinion:
This case is far removed from such decisions. [Helvering v. Eubank, 311
U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl,
281 U.S. 111 (1930)]. Here the parties were confronted by a situation
where inconvenience and resulting dissatisfaction came to the retired agents
by reason of the constantly decreasing payments made by the company under
the original contract To relieve the situation, the company and the tax-
payer, after full and complete negotiations, before retirement of the agent,
agreed to abrogate and annul the old contract, to substitute a new one and
thus to improve the unsatisfactory posture of affairs. The taxpayer did not
reduce to his immediate possession or to his present enjoyment anything that
might thereafter accrue to him. He made no assignment; he took no do-
minion over the accrued commissions other than to agree to receive them
in cash installments as they matured under the contract. He did nothing to
charge himself with the economic benefit to be derived from the accruing
commissions but, on the contrary, let them accumulate under the agreement
whereby the company was to pay the same amount every month rather than
constantly decreasing amounts. 207 F.2d at 713-14.
5 7 While federal courts in subsequent cases have criticized the "business purpose"
gloss on the literal meaning of tax laws, it still seems to be important in the Tax Court.
See, e.g., George W. Drysdale, 32 T.C. 378 (1959), revd, 277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir.
1960); James F. Oates, 18 T.C. 570 (1952), aff'd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), ac-
quiesced in, Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CuA. BULL. 174; Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809
(1947), acquiesced in, 1947-2 CUM. BULL. 4. See also Gemmill, The "Economic
Benefit" Attack on Non-qualified Plans; Cautions for Draftsmen, 22 J. TAXATION 79
(1965).
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contract in that many agents were not satisfied with the old one for
good reasons, and the taxpayer received nothing tangible which
might be termed an economic benefit.
In the Howard Veit58 case, the taxpayer was a participant in a
profit sharing plan. The plan called for a certain part of the com-
pany's profits to be paid to the taxpayer at a certain time." Before
the payments were actually due, the taxpayer and the corporation
entered into another agreement providing for a slight deferral of
the payments. The Government attempted to assess a deficiency
based on the difference between the amounts actually received and
reported by the taxpayer and the amounts he would have received
had he not entered into the subsequent contract. In refuting the
Government's argument, the Tax Court stated:
The only way we should be justified in holding that the petitioner
constructively received [the amount in question] in 1941 would
be to hold that the agreement to defer the payment... was a mere
subterfuge, and sham for the purpose of enabling petitioner to
postpone his income tax on the amount to another year.6°
Later, the same taxpayer executed another agreement with his
employer whereby the amounts due under the first modification
of the agreement were to be deferred again for a period totaling
4 years.6" In again holding for the taxpayer, the Tax Court cited
its prior decision involving Mr. Veit and said, "[tlhere was never
a time when [the amount due] was unqualifiedly subject to peti-
tioner's demand or withdrawal. He did not voluntarily refrain
from collecting money available for him, nor did he agree to the
debtor's deferred payment of money available when the agree-
ments were made.""2
In the Olmsted Inc. Life Agency case," the taxpayer was a
corporation doing business as an insurance agency, which had a
contract with an insurance company to act as an exclusive territorial
58 8 T.C. 809 (1947), acquiesced in, 1947-2 CUM. BULL. 4 (sometimes called the
first Veit case).
59 An interesting feature of the plan in this case was that it not only called for pay-
ments to Mr. Veit if there were profits, but also called for payments by Mr. Veit to the
corporation if there were losses.
60 8 T.C. at 816.
61 This is often called the second Veit case; Howard Veit, 49 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
811 (1949).
62 Id. at 814. The court dismissed the fact that the corporation had taken a deduc-
tion for the full amount of the payments in I year because the corporation was an ac-
crual taxpayer and the executive was a cash basis taxpayer.
63 35 T.C. 429 (1960), nonacquiesced in, 1961-2 CUM. BULL. 4, aff'd, 304 F.2d
16 (8th Cir. 1962).
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agency. As of midnight, December 31, 1955, the parties entered
into An agreement whereby the old contract was cancelled and the
taxpayer assigned to the insurance company all of its rights in re-
newal commissions earned previously and payable after January 1,
1956. The taxpayer agreed also to turn over to the insurance
company all of its records and, in return, the insurance company
agreed to pay the taxpayer $500 per month for the next 15 years,
which sum was based on the present value of all the renewal com-
missions already earned. There was evidence that the transaction
was entered into at least in part 'because of the failing health of Mr.
Olmsted, the major shareholder of the taxpayer corporation. The
Government attempted to increase the taxpayer's income by the
difference between the payments actually received and the present
value of the renewal commissions on the theory that there had
been a "sale" of the right to those commissions and that the con-
sideration therefor was an annuity contract, the present value of
which was the value of the renewal commissions. Both the Tax
Court and the federal court relied on the Oates case and held that
there was no sale and that the payments to the taxpayer were tax-
able only when actually received."
(2) Illustrations of Potential Applications of Constructive
Receipts. -Plans substantially similar to the above arrangements
should have no constructive receipt problems. On the other hand,
the examples which follow illustrate situations in which great care
should be exercised. The George W. Drysdale case65 is set forth
in detail because of its general importance in the field and because
it illustrates the Tax Court's continued reliance on the business
purpose doctrine. For planning purposes, the Drysdale case can
be cited for the proposition that in any arrangement in which it
can be established that the employer was willing to pay the com-
pensation directly to the employee currently, and in which the de-
ferral or establishment of a trust serves no readily ascertainable
business purpose, problems which cannot be resolved at the admin-
64 In Stuetzer, Deferred Compensation Contracts: Individual Contracts: Non-quali-
fied General Plans, N.Y.U. 21sT INsT. ON FED. TAx. 479 (1963), the author sums up
the effect of these cases as follows:
The courts seem to be expressing reluctance to tax executives who are
parties to contracts or plans which confer nothing of possible present value.
Similarly they seem to be permitting deferral of income that might be consid-
ered earned if such deferral precedes the original due date of payment and
is accompanied by some valid business purpose that indicates that the con-
tractual relationship is not a sham.
65 32 T.C. 378 (1959), rev'd & remanded, 277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1960).
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istrative level should not be taken to the Tax Court, but rather
should be taken to the federal courts in a refund suit.
The situations set forth after the Drysdale case are examples of
situations which do not necessarily have constructive receipt prob-
lems, but which should be approached with caution and should not
necessarily be considered as sanctioned by Revenue Ruling 60-31
or Revenue Ruling 67-449.
In the Drysdale case,66 the taxpayer worked for the Briggs cor-
poration under an employment contract which called for a salary
of about $72,000 per year and contained the following provision:
In the event such full time employment of [Drysdale] should ter-
minate prior to his attaining the age of sixty-five years for any
reason other than the death of [Drysdale], then [Drysdale) shall
while living ... be paid monthly an amount not less than $1500
• . . such payments to start thirty days after termination of such
full time employment and to continue for ten years thereafter.67
Subsequently, Briggs sold most of its operation to Chrysler, and
Chrysler then employed Drysdale on a full-time basis. However,
Briggs desired to continue to employ Drysdale on an advisory basis
and entered into an agreement calling for payments of $1,500 per
month to a trust for Drysdale's benefit, the corpus of the trust to be
distributed to Drysdale after he retired. There was evidence that
Briggs was willing to pay the money directly to Drysdale. The
Tax Court held that the entire payments to the trust were income
to the taxpayer in the years they were paid into the trust, on the
basis of constructive receipt. The court distinguished the Oates
case on the basis that a business purpose motivated the agreement
in Oates while no such purpose was present in the Drysdale situa-
tion. In discussing the distinction, the court stated:
In the instant case, however, the only apparent purpose of Briggs'
making the payments to a trustee instead of to petitioner directly
was to reduce petitioner's tax burden.... The facts and circum-
stances surrounding the execution of the amended employment
contract compel the conclusion that the payments to the trustee
pursuant to the contract were compensation for the advisory ser-
vices rendered by petitioner during the years in issue, and peti-
tioner, apparently of his own volition and for no purpose other
than to defer the reporting of income effected a self imposed lim-
itation on his right to receive the payments direct. For this reason
the instant case is distinguishable from Oates . . . and fall[s]
squarely within the scope of Williams v. United States. 8
661d. noted in 43 MARQ. L. REV. 389 (1960).
67 32 T.C. at 379.
68Id. at 384, citing Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955).
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The Sixth Circuit in reversing and remanding the decision of
the Tax Court held that there was no constructive receipt of the
money deposited in the trust because "at no time did the petitioner
have any right to the immediate possession or enjoyment of any-
thing."69  The court also held that the economic benefit doctrine
was inapplicable."
In addition to the general warning expressed in the Drysdale
case, the following particular situations should not be considered
squarely under the protection of Revenue Ruling 60-31 or Revenue
Ruling 67-449: (1) the deferral of income which is fully earned
but not yet payable without forfeiture conditions; (2) any deferral
arrangement which contemplates a -reduction of current compensa-
tion without forfeiture conditions; (3) the deferral of customary
bonuses or regular annual salary increases without forfeiture con-
ditions; and (4) any arrangement which permits an election to
receive the deferred amounts currently71 or to defer amounts other-
wise currently receivable without forfeiture conditions.72
(3) Situations Which Will Definitely Cause the Application
of the Doctrine of Constructive Receipt. -Revenue Ruling 60-31
cautions that "under the doctrine of constructive receipt, a taxpayer
may not deliberately turn his back upon income and thereby select
the year for which he will report it. Nor may a taxpayer, by a
private agreement, postpone receipt of income from one taxable
year to another."73  A classic case involving this so-called "turning
of the back on income" theory is Williams v. United States.74
In Williams the taxpayer sold timber to a purchaser who was
willing and able to pay the full purchase price immediately. The
taxpayer, however, insisted on an irrevocable escrow agreement
69 Drysdale v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 1960).
701d, at 218. The economic benefit doctrine was referred to in the Tax Court's
opinion, but since it decided that the payments were taxable on the constructive receipt
theory, it was not discussed. The Tax Court's opinion also referred to CoDE § 402(b),
on which the Sixth Circuit did not comment. This set the stage for the Doty problem
which came before the Sixth Circuit in 1963. See discussion note 46 supra.
7 1 Rev. Rul. 60-31 did a service to tax planners in the deferred compensation field
but it did not answer all questions. The Ruling expressly cautioned that except in fac-
tual situations substantially similar to those set forth in the examples, each case was to
be determined on its own merits. The following statement which appeared twice in
Revenue Ruling 60-31 should be kept in mind: "it seems clear that in each case involv-
ing a deferral of compensation a determination of whether the doctrine of constructive
receipt is applicable must be made upon the basis of the special factual situation."
72 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
73 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174, 178; see, e.g.; James E. Lewis, 30 B.T.A. 318 (1934);
Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 29 B.T.A. 63 (1933).
74 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955).
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whereby he would receive the purchase price over a period of 5
years. The sole purpose for the escrow agreement was to save
taxes by spreading the receipt of the money and the reporting of
income over a 5-year period. Holding the entire purchase price to
be income to the taxpayer in the year of sale, the Fifth Circuit rea-
soned that when the prospective purchaser desired and offered to
pay the full purchase price, the taxpayer was in constructive re-
ceipt of the money and the self-imposed limitation of the escrow
agreement had no substantive effect upon the transaction.7
Another clear case for the application of the doctrine of con-
structive receipt is the Joseph Frank case.76 The taxpayer and his
employer-corporation reached an agreement in December 1946
whereby the corporation would pay the taxpayer a specified amount
of cash. Funds sufficient to pay the amount were on deposit in a
special bank account and testimony at the trial showed that the
corporation was ready and willing to pay immediately. Yet, at the
request of the taxpayer's counsel, the payment was deferred to Jan-
uary 1947. (The corporation was on a fiscal year ending July 31,
so it had no preference as to when the payment was to be made.)
The Tax Court, however, refused to allow the deferral and held
that the taxpayer constructively received the amounts in 1946."7
In summary, the constructive receipt theory should not trouble
the executive who is still a few years from retirement and enters
into a contract whereby his original salary is increased by a certain
amount which is deferred until after retirement. The employee
who is taking a new position and negotiates a deferred compensa-
tion contract should have no constructive receipt problems if rea-
sonable discretion is used in the ratio of current compensation to
deferred compensation. Caution should be observed in materially
reducing the present salary and paying a part currently (while the
7 5 For a situation in which an escrow arrangement was used and the economic bene-
fit doctrine was applied, see E.T. Sproull, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194
F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952); see Rev. Rul. 60-31 (example 4), 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174,
178.
76 22 T.C. 945 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 226 F.2d 600 (6th Cit. 1955).
77 The Frank case is somewhat complicated by the, taxpayer's original assertion,
which was later abandoned, that a certain part of the settlement was payment for an
alleged assault and therefore not taxable. The taxpayer's later admission that there
was no assault must have put him in a rather bad light before the court. 22 T.C. at
952. In addition, the language of the Tax Court seems to indicate that it relied to some
extent on the so-called business purpose doctrine, which has since been repudiated at
least in the Sixth Circuit. See, e.g., Drysdale v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir.
1960). For other cases applying the constructive receipt theory, see Hineman v. Brod-
rick, 99 F. Supp. 582 (D. Kan. 1951); Frank W. Kunze, 19 T.C. 29 (1952), aff'd per
curiam, 203 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1953).
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employee is still performing the same services) and the remainder
after retirement, with no conditions.78
The second major weapon of the IRS in its attempt to assert
immediate taxation of deferred compensation arrangements is the
economic benefit theory. The basis of the theory lies in the follow-
ing language of the regulations:
If services are paid for other than in money the fair market value
of the property or services taken in payment must be included in
income.70
Notes or other evidences of indebtedness received in payment for
services constitute income in the amount of their fair market value
at the time of the transfer.t°
Items of gross income ... in the computation of taxable income
need not be in the form of cash. It is sufficient that such items
can be valued in terms of money.8'
In the field of deferred compensation, the economic benefit
doctrine is used to impose an immediate tax on the employee where
the employer actually gives property to the employee, gives prop-
erty to a third party to hold for the employee, or itself holds or sets
property aside for the employee. The theory will not generally be
applied unless the employee has a nonforfeitable interest in the
property and his rights are assignable.
Generally, there must be something besides the deferred com-
pensation contract itself in order for the theory to be applied.82 Of
course, negotiable instruments would be sufficient, and, indeed,
evidences of indebtedness not negotiable in the ordinary sense, but
which in fact can be sold, have caused application of the theory.88
78 For an interesting application of the constructive receipt theory to insurance
policies, see Theodore H. Cohen, 39 T.C. 1055 (1963). This case held that the peri-
odic increases in the cash value of insurance contracts do not constitute constructively
received income to the owner of the policy because the realization of this amount is
subject to substantial restrictions - the policy has to be cashed in to get it, id. at 1063,
and that the interest, (or dividends left on deposit) does constitute income constructively
received by the owner of the policy because such amounts are subject to the owner's
unfettered right to withdraw i. Id. at 1064. See also Finnegan, Constructive Receipt
of Income, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAx. 367, 379 (1964).
79 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1957).
80Id. § 1.61-2(d)(4) (1957).
81Id. § 1.446-1(a) (3) (1957), T.D. 6584, 1962-1 Cum. BuLL. 67, T.D. 6834,
1965-2 CuM. BULL. 958.
82T6 invoke application of the economic benefit doctrine the "extra ingredient"
besides the deferred compensation contract can be stock, see Commissioner v. LoBue,
351 U.S. 243 (1956), insurance policies, see N. Loring Danforth, 18 B.T.A. 1221
(1930), or an annuity contract, see William B. Freeman, 4 T.C. 582 (1954).
83See, e.g., Frank Cowden, Sr., 32 T.C. 853 (1959), rev'd & remanded, 289 F.2d
20 (5th Cir. 1961), opinion on remand, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1239 (1961).
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Perhaps the classic economic benefit case is the E.T. Sproull
case.84 Mr. Sproull was an employee of a corporation under a
contract which called for a salary of $12,000 per year. Beginning
in 1929, the corporation was unable to pay the salary because of
the depression, so Mr. Sproull voluntarily agreed to take a smaller
salary. By 1945, the company was financially stronger and agreed
with Mr. Sproull that in consideration for past services rendered
the corporation would pay over to a trustee the sum of $10,000 in
that year. The trustee was directed to hold, to invest, and to pay
over this sum to Mr. Sproull or to his estate in two installments,
one in 1946, and the other in 1947. Mr. Sproull's rights in the
trust were vested and presumably assignable. Both the Tax Court
and the Sixth Circuit held that the entire trust fund was income to
Mr. Sproull in 1945, the year in which he had received an economic
benefit.8 5
Revenue Ruling 60-3186 provides an example of a situation in
which the economic benefit doctrine is applied in the context of an
escrow arrangement. In the example, a football player, upon ex-
ecution of a contract to play professional football, was awarded a
bonus which was paid to a designated escrow agent for later pay-
ment to the football player. The Ruling stated that the creation
of this escrow fund in which the football player had nonforfeitable
rights was a sufficient economic benefit to justify its immediate
taxation to him in the year in which the contract was executed.
Although no explicit discussion concerned the assignability of the
football player's rights under the escrow agreement, the example did
state that the agreement would be binding on the party's successors
and assigns, thus implying that a case in which the employee's
rights were expressly unassignable could be distinguished.
Perhaps the most important case involving economic benefit
is the Frank Cowden, Sr. case.87 The facts concerned taxpayers
who granted a mineral lease for certain oil properties. The lessee
was willing and able to pay the entire purchase price in the year in
which the contract was executed, but the taxpayers requested that
84 16 T.C. 244 (1951), af 'd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
85 The court relied principally on the cases of Renton K. Brodie, 1 T.C. 275 (1942),
and J.H. McEwen, 6 T.C. 1018 (1946), which involved annuity contracts. 16 T.C. at
247. It is interesting to note that in the Brodie case, one of the arguments of the tax-
payer was that the annuity had no cash value and could not be assigned.
86 Rev. Rul. 60-31 (example 4), 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 174, 176-77.
87 32 T.C. 853 (1959), rev'd & remanded, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961), opinion
on remand, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 1239 (1961), noted in 59 CoLUM. L. R v. 1237
(1959).
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the payments be deferred, some to be paid on execution and addi-
tional amounts to be paid each year for the next 2 years. The
lessee's obligation to make the additional payments in the subse-
quent years was evidenced by separate instruments signed by the
lessee. The taxpayers received the payments called for at execution
and reported only those payments in their income for that year.
The Commissioner attempted to assess a deficiency based on the
difference between the amounts actually received and reported and
the entire amount called for -by the contract and evidenced by the
separate certificates. The Tax Court held for the Commissioner
on the economic benefit theory. The court thought that the tax-
payers received an economic benefit when they received the con-
tract and the separate instruments evidencing the lessees liability
to pay. The court emphasized the following facts:
payors were perfectly willing and able at the time of execution of
the leases ... to pay ... in an immediate lump-sum payment; ...
[one of the taxpayers) believed the bonus agreements had a mar-
ket value at the time of their execution; that a bank in which he
was an officer and depositor was willing to and in fact did pur-
chase such rights at a nominal discount; that the bank considered
such rights to be bankable and to represent direct obligations of
the payor; that the bank generally dealt in such contracts where
it was satisfied with the financial responsibility of the payor and
looked solely to it for payment without recourse to the lessor and,
in short, that the sole reason why bonuses were not immediately
paid in cash upon execution of the leases involved was the refusal
of the lessor to receive such payments. We are convinced from
the particular facts of this case that.., the bonus payments were
not only readily but immediately convertible to and were the
equivalent of cash and for that reason had a fair market value in
their face amounts.88
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded
the Tax Court's decision. " The court of appeals said, in effect,
that (1) the Tax Court should have disregarded the willingness of
the lessor to pay immediately; (2) the Tax Court's dissenting opin-
ion stating, in effect, that whether an instrument had fair market
value depended upon negotiability was not valid, it being "as un-
realistic as it is formalistic";"0 and (3) as a general proposition, an
8s 32 T.C. at 858. There was an interesting dissenting opinion by two Tax Court
judges, which spoke of "constructive receipt" but apparently meant economic benefit in
the context in which it was used. Id. at 860. Also, the dissent apparently thought that
the line between instruments having fair market value and those having merely intrinsic
value should be drawn at the line of negotiability. Id. at 858.
89 Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
901d. at 24.
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executory contract to make future payments in money does not
have a fair market value, but the other separate instrument may
have a fair market value.
The court of appeals remanded the case to the Tax Court to
determine, without considering the willingness of the lessor to pay
or the lessee to receive the full amounts on execution of the leases,
whether the bonus obligations evidenced by the separate writing
were taxable in the year of the agreement as the equivalent of cash.
On remand, the Tax Court determined that the obligations of
the company were the equivalent of cash." In view of the partic-
ular facts of the Cowden case, there can be little argument with
the final result. Yet, the case is significant in that it illustrates the
dangers of allowing an assignment of the employee's rights and
incorporating the obligation to pay in a separate instrument, which
is in addition to the basic contract.
The Harold G. Perkins case9" is an example of a situation in
which a trust was created for the benefit of some key employees
and the economic benefit theory was not applied. According to
the terms of the trust agreement involved in the case, the employ-
91 Frank Cowden, Sr., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1239 (1961). The Cowden case was
distinguished in Leonard Hyatt, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1789 (1961), af 'd per curiam,
325 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1963). The Hyatt case seemed to restrictively interpret the
Cowden case and limit it to its particular facts. The Tax Court stated:
The facts in the case before us [Hyatt] are distinguishable from those in-
volved in [Cowden) in which the taxpayers acquired an advance royalty or
bonus contract as part consideration for the execution of a mineral lease to
an oil company. There the obligor was dearly able to fulfill its contractual
obligation. The taxpayers believed that the bonus agreement had an ascer-
tainable fair market value at the time of its execution. They intended to sell
the bonus agreement prior to maturity and in fact did sell it to a bank at a
nominal discount shortly after the time of acquisition. The bank which pur-
chased the bonus contract previously had dealt in such agreements and con-
sidered them to be "bankable." We there found [on remand] that the bonus
contract in question was readily convertible and was converted to cash and
therefore was the equivalent thereof.
In the instant case Hyatt did not sell the assignment agreement he ac-
quired from United Security .... The record does not indicate that he had
any intention of selling it prior to maturity or that he had any knowledge of
a prospective purchaser. Further, it does not appear that Hyatt believed or
that in these circumstances he reasonably could have believed that the assign-
ment contract had an ascertainable fair market value at the time of execution.
Id. at 1805.
92 8 T.C. 1051 (1947). See also Clifton B. Russell, 5 T.C. 974 (1945), acquiesced
in, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 4, where the employer agreed to pay a bonus to Russell in 1941
on such terms as the treasurer elected during the current fiscal year of the corporation,
which ended on March 31. The corporation decided in 1941 to pay Russell half his
bonus in cash immediately and to establish a trust for him with the other half. Half
was paid in 1941, and reported as income, and the other half was put into the trust,
which was not established until 1942. Under these facts, the court held that neither
the economic benefit doctrine nor the constructive receipt doctrine was applicable.
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ees had to remain with the employer for 5 years in order to receive
the benefits. If they left before then, one-half of their benefits
would be forfeited and allocated to the other participants. The
Tax Court held that, as to the one-half which was forfeitable, the
economic benefit doctrine did not apply."
In summary, the problem of economic benefit will be avoided
if the employee is (1) given nothing tangible besides the contract
which spells out the agreement; (2) the contract contains a provi-
sion against assignment; and (3) no fund (escrow, trust, or insur-
ance) is established for the employee in which he obtains nonfor-
feitable rights, and which purports to be insulated from the claims
of general creditors of the employer.
D. Assuring Both the Employer and the Executive that There
Will Be No Other Disadvantages Created by the Plan or Distribu-
tions from the PlanP4
Unless proper care is taken, a deferred compensation agree-
ment can cause unexpected problems in other unrelated areas.
Generally, an awareness of these potential trouble spots will be
sufficient to avoid them. The major points of possible detrimental
interaction are outlined below.
(1) Income Tax - Withholding Requirements. -As a gen-
eral proposition, if the employee will be taxed on the employer's
payments to him, the employer will be required to withhold in-
come taxes. If the employee realizes no immediate taxable income,
however, then a withholding will not be required merely because
amounts are set aside in a funded arrangement for the employee."
Specific treasury regulations96 provide for exemption from the in-
come tax withholding provisions for subsequent distributions from
the fund to the employee.
(2) Income Tax - Payments to Beneficiary. -If an employee
designates a beneficiary to receive payments due him under a plan
03 The employer's deduction was not at issue in this case. Presumably, the em-
ployer was not entitled to the deduction for the forfeitable contributions to the trust.
See discussion in text accompanying note 17 supra.
94 A more descriptive name for this section would be "Miscellaneous Ways To Get
in Trouble."
95 20-2d T.M. PORTFOLIO, supra note 1, at A25-26.
96Treas. Reg. § 1A02(b)-1 (b) (1956), T.D. 6783, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 180, T.D.
6885, 1966-2 CUm BULL. 307; id. 5 1.403(a)-1(b) (1956), T.D. 6676, 1963-2 CuM.
BULL. 41, T.D. 6885, 1966-2 CUM, BULL. 307.
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during the employee's life, the classic assignment of income cases97
would undoubtedly apply and the payments would be income to
the employee and not to the recipient-benefidary.98 If the payments
are made to the executive's estate or to beneficiaries after his death,
these payments are income "in respect of a decedent."99
In a nonqualified plan, the $5,000 death benefit exclusion from
taxable income applicable to the employer's contributions relates
only to the portion of the benefit which was forfeitable immediately
before death.'
(3) Income Tax - Capital Gains - Qualified Plans. -If the
employee is covered by both a nonqualified deferred compensation
agreement which calls for him to render consultative services after
retirement and a qualified pension or profit sharing plan in which
lump-sum payments are possible, then it is important to determine
whether the employee, in performing the services, is doing so as an
employee or as an independent contractor. If he is acting as an
employee, he has not terminated his employment and any lump-
sum payment from a qualified retirement plan will be treated as
ordinary income instead of as a long term capital gain.'
(4) Income Tax Penalties. -Internal Revenue Code section
6601(a) provides that a 6 percent per annum interest penalty may
be charged on any deficiency, but the interest itself is deductible.
In addition, there are other penalties for negligent or intentional
disregard of the income tax laws." 2
(5) Social Security Benefits. -If the employee is under age
72 and receives social security benefits, the deferred compensation
plan should not cause the loss or reduction of these benefits by
providing, or being open to, the interpretation that some of the
deferred compensation is being paid for consultative services." 3
97 See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
98 See also Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c) (1956).
99 1d. § 1.691(a)-2(b) (1956) (example 4); 1 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 362-
73 (3d ed. 1961).
100 CoDE § 101(b) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-1(d) (1957), T.D. 6808, 1965-1
CUM. BULL. 257. See also Harrison, Deferred Compensation Plans Have Hidden Es-
tate Planning Problems, 21 J. TAxATION 16 (1964).
101 For further discussion of this problem, see Harrison, supra note 100, at 18. Mr.
Harrison suggests that it would be helpful to have specific provisions in the document
allowing the executive to arrange his own time to work and permitting him to work
where he chooses.
102 See, e.g., CODE § 6653(a).
103 Social Security Act S§ 203 (b), (f), 42 U.S.C. 5 301 (1964).
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This can occur if the employee is required to render "substantial"' 4
consultative services in order to receive the compensation." 5
(6) Estate Planning - Estate Tax. -If a deferred compensa-
tion arrangement provides for payments to the employee if living
and to his estate or to a beneficiary designated by him if not living,
the present value of any future payments is includible in his gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes. This is usually not deemed
to be a significant disadvantage. If the plan provides for lump-
sum or commuted payments at the death of the executive, a substan-
tial advantage will be gained in providing additional liquidity in the
estate. If no such lump sum or commuted payments are offered,
the estate plan should be analyzed to make sure that the estate will
be sufficiently liquid to meet the increased estate taxes and expenses
of administration caused by the increase in the gross estate because
of the inclusion of the present value of the future payments."'
(7) Estate Planning - Marital Deduction. -The basic
estate planning problem to be considered in deferred compensation
plans is whether to qualify the death benefits for the marital deduc-
tion. Assuming that the deferred compensation amounts are not
required for payment of taxes and expenses of administration, it
would be desirable to have this usually highly liquid asset qualify
for the marital deduction trust, since that trust should be consumed
first in order to minimize the estate taxes on the death of the surviv-
ing spouse. Section 691(a)(1), however, allows an income tax
deduction to the beneficiaries for any estate taxes attributable to
such a death benefit. If the benefit is used to provide a marital
deduction, there are no estate taxes attributable to it and therefore
no income tax deduction.0 ' It may therefore be advisable to have
104 "Substantial' is generally considered to be 45 hours per month or more. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.416a(a)(2) (1967).
105The employee-independent contractor question is also present here. See 20
C.F.R §§ 404.1027(b), (c) (1967); Social Security Ruling 61-41, 1960-61 Soc. SEC.
CUM. BULL. 57; G.T. WAsHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE COR-
PORATE ExEcuTVE 158 (3d ed. 1962); Rivers, Collateralized Deferred Compensation
-Poison or Panacea, 20 J. Am SoC'Y C.LU. 37 (1966).
la drafting the agreement, it would be possible to expressly limit consultative ser-
vices to less than 45 hours per month and to allow the executive freedom to choose
his own time and place for doing the consultative work and/or provide for additional
payments on an hourly basis for consultative services actually rendered.
106 See generally Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes,
1959 DUKE L.J. 341; Weinberg, Taxation of Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation
Plans, 52 KY. L.J. 750 (1964); Note, Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits, 66
YALE L.J. 1217 (1957).
107 Rivers, supra note 105; Stoeber, New Look at Non-Qualified Deferred Com-
pensation Plans, 19 J. AM. SoC'y C.L.U. 224 (1965).
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the retirement benefits payable to someone other than a surviving
spouse or a marital deduction trust, such as a nonmarital trust.
(8) Gift Tax. -Where an employee has a nonforfeitable
right to future payments and he makes an irrevocable designation
of a person to receive them, he has probably made a completed
gift, ' 8 the value of which will require some actuarial computa-
tions.' Of course, the actual receipt of payments by a beneficiary
during the employee's lifetime results in a taxable gift.
IV. DRAFTING THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS
A. General Considerations
In preparing deferred compensation contracts, it should be kept
in mind that most of them are basically nothing more than an em-
ployment agreement with part of the compensation to be paid after
the services are rendered. Tax factors are important, but they
should not exclude attention to the general business considerations
involved. In drafting any employment contract, including a de-
ferred compensation agreement, the following should be consid-
ered:
(1) The agreement should clearly recite that the company
employs the employee and the employee accepts the employment
with the company for a specific term beginning on a certain date
and ending on a certain date. Consideration should be given to
whether the employee is obligated to retire at a certain time or
whether, if the circumstances warrant, the agreement can be mod-
ified so that the employee continues to work on a full-time or part-
time basis for the company with a corresponding alteration being
made in the provisions for the payment of the deferred part of the
compensation. For example, the employee may be extremely val-
uable to the company but may have declining health. It may be
advantageous to provide for a primary term of employment, being
a relatively short period in which he continues his present duties
while the company endeavors to find a potential replacement, and
for which the employee is paid his regular salary; a secondary term
of employment in which the employee works part time, training
the replacement and supervising important work, and receiving a
reduced compensation; and finally, a retirement period in which
108 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(10) (1966).
109 CODE S 2503(b). It should be kept in mind that gifts of a future interest do
not qualify for the $3,000 annual gift tax exclusion.
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the employee completely retires and receives the deferred compen-
sation benefits.
(2) The duties of the employee should be delineated to the
maximum extent possible. If the employee is to hold an office of
the company or to serve on its board of directors, the agreement
should state whether he will receive additional compensation for
these services. The employee's authority should be fairly specific.
For instance, the agreement can contain a preliminary recital that
the employee's authority shall be that usually exercised by an ex-
ecutive occupying a comparable position in a company of compar-
able size and in the same nature of business. The agreement can
then specify what his authority shall include, but not be limited to,
and recite any specific authority which the employee is to have,
such as the establishment of operating, sales, and administrative
policies of the company, and the hiring, firing, and determination
of compensation of personnel.
(3) The executive's rights in the event the business is sold
should be spelled out."'
(4) The agreement should contain provisions for what will
occur if the executive dies either during the term of the actual
employment or after retirement.
(5) Provisions should also be made for what will occur on
the disability of the executive either during the term of the actual
employment or after retirement."1
(6) Any limits on the executive's authority to incur expenses
on behalf of the company should be stated. Also, in light of In-
ternal Revenue Service requirements, it is advisable to provide that
the employee shall furnish detailed accounts and receipts for ex-
penses which are reimbursed."
(7) It should be stated whether the employee is to be covered
110 "Sale" should probably be defined to include
(a) the sale by the Employer of substantially all of its assets to a single pur-
chaser or to a group of associated purchasers; (b) the sale, exchange, or other
disposition, in one transaction, of two-thirds of the outstanding capital stock
of the Employer; (c) a bona fide decision by the Employer to terminate its
business and liquidate its assets; or (d) the merger or consolidation of the
employer in a transaction in which the stockholders of the employer receive
less than fifty percent of the outstanding voting stock of the new or continu-
ing corporation. 5 J. RABKMN & M JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS,
form no. 12.01, ch. 12, at 25 (1967).
Il It is especially important to provide an adequate definition for the term "dis-
ability." Id., ch. 12, contains some examples.
"
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17 (1958), T.D. 6630, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 21, discusses
income tax treatment of these amounts.
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by additional benefits provided by the company for other employees,
such as hospital insurance or group life insurance.
(8) Consideration should generally be given to the insertion
of some type of restrictive covenant in the contract. Basically, such
covenants are of two types: one prohibits the executive from en-
gaging in competitive activity during the full-time employment or
a short period thereafter, and the other limits the ability of the
executive to engage in any form of competition during his retire-
ment period. It is important for the covenant not to be too exten-
sive in this respect, because in order -for a restrictive covenant to be
enforceable it must be reasonable." 3 Usually, the covenant is con-
sidered to be either entirely reasonable or entirely unreasonable
and if it is deemed to be the latter, it is completely unenforceable."4
The restrictive covenant should be tailored to the particular sit-
uation so that the maximum enforceable restrictions are achieved.
The basic problems will be: (1) defining the business of the em-
ployer and stating exactly in what activities the employee is pro-
hibited from engaging, (2) defining the limitations as to area, and
(3) defining the limitations as to time. Most of the cases in this
area involve covenants of employees who later attempt to find
other employment; few cases involve competition by a person who
is supposed to be retired. It is believed that this basic fundamental
difference could be used to distinguish most of the existing author-
ity in an attempt to validate a restriction which, on its surface,
would seem unreasonable if applied to a person who would be de-
prived of his method of earning a livelihood if it were enforced." 5
(9) In drafting an agreement, consideration should be given
to an arbitration clause.
(10) The agreement should probably prohibit the assignment
313 One of the most important factors in determining the reasonableness of any
given restriction is the necessity of the restriction for the employer's business. The
covenant should do as much as possible to recite why it is necessary.
114 Ohio follows the so-called "blue pencil" doctrine which can save part of a re-
striction if only part is unreasonable. However, in order for the court to apply this
doctrine and strike out the unreasonable portion, the provisions must be separable. See
Extine v. Williamson Midwest Co., 176 Ohio St. 403, 200 N.E.2d 297 (1964); Briggs
v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1942); E.P.I. of Cleveland, Inc. v. Basler,
12 Ohio App. 2d 16, 230 N.E.2d 552 (1967); Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 104
Ohio App. 8, 146 N.E.2d 447 (1959); Toulmin v. Becker, 124 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Cr.
App. 1954); Segal v. Fleischer, 93 Ohio App. 315, 113 N.E.2d 608 (1952); Gates-
McDonald Co. v. McQuilkin, 34 N.E.2d 443 (Ohio Cr. App. 1941); Skyland Broad-
casting Corp. v. Hamby, 141 N.E.2d 783 (Ohio C.P. 1957); Arthur Murray Dance
Studio v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
115 G.T. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 105, at 116.
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of the benefits payable thereunder for the convenience of the com-
pany and for the tax advantage of the employee." 6
(11) It is important to define all terms which may cause a
dispute in the document. The words "disability" and "profit" are
particularly susceptible to dispute.
(12) If the executive is to receive other fringe benefits, such
as paid vacations, company-owned and maintained automobiles,
and club memberships, these should be specifically included in the
employment contract.
(13) General considerations. The employment agreement
should usually contain the general "boiler plate" provisions includ-
ing a clause pertaining to the giving of notices, a waiver of breach
clause stating that the waiver by the company of a breach of any
provision of the agreement by the executive does not operate as
a waiver of any subsequent breach by the executive. It should also
contain a clause reciting that the instrument contains the entire
agreement between the parties and may not be changed orally, but
only by agreement in writing signed by the party against whom
enforcement of any waiver, change, modification, or discharge is
sought.
B. Special Problems
In addition to the above general considerations, a deferred
compensation agreement raises some special problems, such as (1)
the amounts and method of computation of the deferred compen-
sation, (2) the method of payment of the deferred portion of the
compensation, and (3) conditions as to the receipt of the compen-
sation both during employment and during retirement.
(1) Computation of the Amounts To Be Paid. -- Once the
total amount of the employee's compensation is decided upon, it
must be determined how much is to be deferred. One of the sim-
plest and most direct methods is to provide that the employee will
receive a certain fixed salary, a certain fixed part of which is to 'be
116 The draftsman should observe the general laws governing the validity of re-
straints on alienation. A restriction which is certainly invalid under State law might
not achieve the necessary objective for tax purposes. The Ohio law on this point is not
particularly dear. The case of Sherrow v. Brookover, 174 Ohio St. 310, 189 N.E.2d 90
(1963), held that a straight spendthrift provision in a trust was invalid. The "straight"
spendthrift provision merely states in effect that the beneficiary's interest is not subject
to the claims of creditors. The Sherrow case did not determine the validity of the
beneficiary's voluntary alienation nor the validity of forfeiture or discretionary trusts.
Appropriate caution should be observed in relying on cases dealing with trusts in the
unfunded deferred compensation areas.
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paid currently and a certain fixed part of which is to be paid to him
at certain future times specified in the agreement, usually after
retirement. A provision of this type can be presented in a narrative
form or a table can be provided showing the amount of compen-
sation payable each year, the amount deferred, and when the de-
ferred amount will be paid. The contract can provide for a con-
stant or increasing salary and for uniform or varying percentages
of that salary to be paid currently and the remainder to be deferred.
The deferred amount can be expressed as a percentage of the salary
for the year of employment or, if the employment is to be for more
than one year, it can be expressed as a percentage of the average
annual compensation over the term or a percentage of the last
year's compensation. The compensation, both immediate and de-
ferred, can be made subject to the current profits of the company
during the employment period." 7  In unique situations, the com-
pensation can be based on the company's billing, gross receipts, or
return on net worth.
The amounts payable to the employee can be reduced by a
certain amount or by a certain percentage if the employee has other
income from other sources. The reduction can follow a certain
schedule whereby most of the amounts are to be paid if the em-
ployee's other compensation is small and small amounts are to be
paid if the employee has substantial other income.
The amounts paid can be made subject to adjustment to reflect
inflation, but this adds considerable complexity to an agreement
which otherwise can be quite simple."8
(2) Method of Payment - To Whom and How Much.
Deferred compensation can be paid in two basic methods. The
first method is to pay the employee a fixed amount over a fixed
period of time according to a fixed formula. Second is the annuity
method in which amounts are paid to the employee for the dura-
tion of his life. There are innumerable combinations and varia-
tions of these two basic methods. For instance, the benefits can be
paid in the form of a joint and survivorship annuity or annuities
with a certain number of guaranteed payments or a payment of a
117 The methods for computing the profits are almost limitless. For ideas, see 5
J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 110, ch. 12.
118 This could be done, for example, by gearing the payments to the consumer price
index or to raises given to other executives (especially if the company gives cost of liv-
ing increases). The payments could be geared to the value of the company stock, or
other stock market indexes, but this would be likely to cause too much variance. Corn-
field, Executive Deferred Compensation, 36 TAXES 557 (1958), contains a discussion
of how to have contracts reflect inflationary pressures.
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certain amount to the employee for the duration of his life and
thereafter a payment of a certain lesser amount to the employee's
spouse or other beneficiary for the duration of her life.
If an annuity form of payment is used, the employer may not
want to take the risk of the unknown factor of the employee's life
expectancy, and therefore, it will probably want to buy an annuity
from a life insurance company so as to fix the liability. The em-
ployer will not face a significant tax risk if it buys an annuity on
his employee's life with itself as the owner and beneficiary. It
should not be done by simply buying an annuity for the employee
because this would result in adverse tax consequences.1
Benefits may be paid to a person other than the employee, but
if the employee is living at the time of any payment, that payment
will be includible in the employee's gross income under the assign-
ment of income doctrine.
Generally, if the plan calls for a fixed number of payments, it
will also provide for the payment of any installments unpaid at
the employee's death to his estate or to his beneficiary. The ben-
eficiary can be designated in the plan by a fixed formula,12 ° or the
employee can be given the right to designate the beneficiary by his
will or any designation of beneficiary form supplied by the em-
ployer.' The plan should probably provide for a payee in default
of the employee's designation.
Some deferred compensation plans provide for the payment of
death benefits unrelated to the deferred compensation earned by
119 20-2d T.M. PORTFOLIO, supra note 1, at 38; Robinson, Deferred Compensation
in Reverse, Tax and Practical Advantages of Insured Plan, 99 TRUST & ESTATES 92
(1960).
1 20 The plan could simply state that the death benefits will be paid initially to
the spouse of the executive if living at the time of death of the executive or to the chil-
dren of the executive per stirpes, if the spouse is not living.
.121 Since the beneficiary is to receive an interest in the accumulated fund only upon
the death of the employee, it might be argued that the designation of the beneficiary
is a testamentary disposition which must comply with the formalities required of a will.
However, because the beneficiary under a retirement plan acquires his interest by con-
tract in the same manner as the beneficiary of a regular life insurance policy, the plan
designation should be considered a nontestamentary will substitute. See I PAGE, THE
LAW OF WILLS § 6.1 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1960). In most of the few cases that have
considered the problem, the right of the designated beneficiary of a deceased employee
who had participated in a pension or retirement plan to take by the terms of the plan
has been upheld. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 152 So. 2d (Fla. App. 1963) (public
plan); Buehler v. Buehler, 323 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (private plan); Is re
Koss' Estate, 106 N.J. Eq. 323, 150 A. 360 (1930) (private stock-purchase plan). In
New York, it is expressly provided by statute that the designation of a beneficiary under
a pension, profit-sharing, or other specified plan "shall not be impaired or defeated by
any statute or rule of law governing the transfer of property by will, gift or intestacy."
N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAw art 13, § 3.2(a) (McKinney 1967).
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the employee as of the time of his death. This may be thought to
be incompatible with the basic concept of deferred compensation
agreements calling for a delayed payment of amounts which would
otherwise be paid as current compensation; however, these death
benefits are frequently included and in some cases serve extremely
useful functions. The function of the special death, benefit is, of
course, to enlarge the estate and provide for the beneficiaries of the
employee whose estate is inadequate and who has not accumulated
sufficient normal benefits for his survivors under other employee
benefit plans. If the death benefit is substantial, the risk of the
premature death of the employee makes it extremely advisable for
the employer to purchase life insurance on the employee's life. The
advantage of providing special death benefits through the deferred
compensation plan rather than through the purchase of life insur-
ance for the employee is that the premiums of the latter would be
includible in his gross income. The disadvantage is that the death
benefits would be taxable income in respect of a decedent to the
recipient subject to a possible $5,000 exclusion whereas the pro-
ceeds of a life insurance policy owned by the employee would not. 22
For this reason, deferred compensation death benefits, if at all sub-
stantial, should be paid in installments.
(a) Investment Accounts. -Another possible way of com-
puting and providing amounts for payment as deferred compensa-
tion to an employee is the use of an investment account. Under
this method, funds are actually set aside by the corporation in a
separate account, which are then invested in securities or other
investments. The securities are usually of the type traded on a
stock exchange rather than securities of the company itself. The
taxes on the income generated by this account will be paid by the
corporation because the funds necessarily must be in the name of
the corporation, but they will be charged to the account, thereby
reducing it by the extra taxes. At retirement, the employee then
receives the increase in value of the fund. There has been some
criticism of this type of plan on the grounds that it is illogical. The
employee's compensation is not based on the performance of the
company for which he is working; rather, it is based on the per-
formance of such stocks as have been purchased for the fund.
However, this type of arrangement is generally used only for highly
paid employees of fairly large corporations who already have large
blocs of stock in the company for which they work. It is believed
122 CODE § 101(b).
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that this type of arrangement allows for investment diversification
and therefore benefits the employee, making it not at all illogical.
If the investment account device is employed in the proper situation
where the employee already has a large bloc of stock in the em-
ployer-corporation and is therefore sufficiently motivated to use
his best efforts to see to the success of that corporation, there is no
logical reason why the company should not give him compensation
in the form of securities of other corporations so that his invest-
ments are diversified.
(b) Shadow Stock Plans. -Another method to compute
amounts payable to an employee as a form of deferred compensa-
tion is the "shadow stock plan." Under this type of arrangement,
the employee is granted a number of "units" of participation, each
unit being the theoretical equivalent of a share of stock in the com-
pany and having assigned to it a value equal to the fair market
value of the stock at the time it is awarded. From time to time
thereafter the account is credited with so-called dividend equiva-
lents on each unit of participation which are equal to the dividends
paid on the actual shares of stock. When the plan terminates, the
employee receives the appreciation, if any, in the value of a com-
parable number of shares of stock between the date the units were
credited to him and the date of termination and, in addition, he
receives the dividend equivalents previously credited to him. Thus,
the employee is given the benefits of dividends on the stock and
the appreciation in value of the stock without actually owning any
stock. Shadow stock plans can become quite complex and have
innumerable variations.12
(3) Conditions As to the Receipt of the Compensation Both
During Employment and During Retirement. -The employee's
right to receive the compensation provided for in the deferred com-
pensation agreement can be made subject to two sets of conditions
preretirement conditions and postretirement conditions.
It is sometimes advisable from a business point of view to have
a provision in the deferred compensation agreement to the effect
that the compensation provided for by the agreement will be re-
ceived by the employee only while he is employed by the company
or only after his employment is terminated under certain circum-
stances. .Generally, these circumstances are retirement, death or
123 See Shelmerdine, Shadow Stock Deferred Compensation Arrangements, N.Y.U.
17TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 933 (1959); Phantom Stock Plans; An Increasingly Popular
Form of Executive Compensation, 22 J. TAXATION 342 (1965).
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disability, termination by the corporation for any reason other than
dishonesty or wrongful conduct on the part of the employee, and
termination as a result of other circumstances which are not deemed
by the board of directors of the corporation to be prejudicial to the
interests of the corporation.
As an alternative drafting technique, it can be provided that,
if the employee's employment is terminated for any reasons such
as discharge for dishonesty, insubordination, or destruction of com-
pany property, the unpaid amounts called for -by the deferred com-
pensation agreement shall be forfeited.
The retirement payments can also be made subject to certain
postretirement conditions. Some possible conditions are that the
employee shall render consultative services and/or serve on the
board of directors, refrain from competing with the company, re-
frain from disclosing to unauthorized persons information relative
to the business of the corporation, the disclosure of which might
be harmful to the company, and refrain from acting in a manner
which the employer shall have reason to believe is detrimental or
contrary to the best interests of the corporation.
Sometimes it is advisable to provide that a valued employee
who has accumulated a great deal of knowledge and experience
should hold himself open to render consultative services to the
corporation after his retirement. However, if the consultative ser-
vices called for, or those actually rendered, are substantial in nature,
this may cause the continuance of the employment relationship for
social security purposes, withholding tax purposes, and for purposes
of the regular qualified deferred compensation plans. For this
reason, unless it is actually contemplated that some consultative
services will be rendered and unless the employee actually has some
beneficial knowledge and ability which the corporation could use
after his retirement, a provision for consultative services should
probably be omitted. 2 ' As mentioned earlier, an agreement not
to compete must be reasonable and its reasonableness must be de-
termined by reference to the conditions of the industry, to the condi-
tions of the company, to the position of the employee giving the
agreement, and to the local law. 125
If the employee will probably have confidential information,
124 For an argument that contingencies are still advisable in deferred compensation
contracts even after Revenue Ruling 60-31, see Appert, Contingencies in Deferred
Compensation Arrangements May Still Be a Wise Precaution, 13 J. TAXATION 12
(1960).
125 For a summary of the law in Ohio, see cases cited note 114 supra.
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it would be a good idea to provide as a postretirement condition
that he should not disclose this information to others. This gives
the company a practical method of enforcing the particular pro-
vision by simply cutting off the payments. In addition, if the dis-
closure provisions are fair and reasonable, they can probably ex-
tend and clarify the substantive content of the general law involv-
ing disclosure of trade secrets.
The effect of contingencies in deferred compensation arrange-
ments has been recently discussed in Revenue Ruling 67-449. In
that ruling, the Internal Revenue Service approved a nonqualified
deferred compensation plan which gave the employee some choice
as to the amounts and years of payment of the installments. The
apparent key to the approval of that plan was the substantial for-
feiture provisions contained therein, and it has been indicated that
this might foreshadow IRS insistence that contingencies must be
included in all deferred compensation plans. 2' Revenue Ruling
67-449 did not mention Revenue Ruling 60-31, so it is difficult
to put the two rulings in overall perspective. However, it would ap-
pear that there is a basic distinction -between plans of the type set
forth in Revenue Ruling 60-31, which called for payments at spe-
cific times, and the plan presented in Revenue Ruling 67-449,
which allowed the employee an election both as to the times of
payment and the amounts of each payment. It would seem clear
that contingencies are still not required in the "60-31-type" plans,
but that substantial forfeiture provisions are required in "67-449-
type" plans, which allow the employee after the services have been
performed and the amounts of payment ascertained, to elect both
when and in what amounts the deferred payments will be made.
The problem left for future resolution concerns the middle ground
between the two extremes. For example, it is not clear whether
forfeiture provisions are necessary in plans which would allow
elections, but only before the amount is ascertained and before
substantially all of the services have been rendered.'27
126 See Lurie, The Problems Created by IRS New Stress on Contingencies in Non-
qualified Plans, 28 J. TAXATIoN 258 (1968).
12 7 The "earning out" language of Revenue Ruling 67-449 is unique. "Earning
out" is apparently synonymous with satisfaction of all of the conditions contained in
the plan, but the term can be susceptible to a greater meaning. "Earning out" could
mean the performance by the employee of overt acts which constitute a benefit to the
employee, as opposed to merely refraining from doing certain things detrimental to
the employer. The exact meaning of "earning out" will be left for future determina-
tion. The phrase may become important in drafting plans allowing elections by the
employee.
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V. CONCLUSION
Deferred compensation arrangements are an important part of
the employee compensation picture. In examining any particular
situation, the first step must be the analysis of the entire compensa-
tion framework. Current compensation, the more traditional
fringe benefits, and the tax-favored qualified plans should be con-
sidered. The second step of the examination should be to make a
careful, thorough analysis of the net economic effect of the deferral
of some portion of compensation. If the first and second steps
indicate that a deferred compensation arrangement would be ad-
vantageous, the third step will be the determination of the type of
plan best suited for the particular situation, in light of the objec-
tives and tax rules discussed above. Once the basic type of plan
is decided upon, the appropriate documents must be drawn. Gen-
erally, the document should take the form of an employment con-
tract with special provisions dealing with the retirement of the
employee and the deferred payments. In most cases, the arrange-
ment should be unfunded with the employee's rights to the deferred
payment forfeitable at least until retirement. Provisions calling
for consultative services should be included only after careful con-
sideration of the problems they cause. The agreement should pro-
hibit direct competition after retirement, and if the plan permits
any type of election, substantial forfeiture provisions should be
considered, not only until retirement but after retirement until the
actual compensation is received.
